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The Contemporary Debate on the Theory of Ideology
The contemporary debate on ideology is mostly inscribed within a more general philosophical trend, which assumes that we are living -as Norval (2000a: 313) has put it -in a sort of 'post-metaphysical world', that is, a world devoid of intrinsic meaning. The deepening of this view in the current stage of social sciences and humanities is attributed, in part, to the so-called 'linguistic turn', that is, the radical shift of the starting point of philosophical analysis from a rational conscious individual-centered optic to the analysis of the structure of language. Aletta J. Norval (ibid.: 313, note 4) reminds us that the first use of this term is found in the works of one of the members of the 'Vienna Circle', Gustav Bergmann. However, it is since the publication of Richard Rorty's book, The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method in 1967 that the use of the term began to be popularized. Far from being concerned with discerning the intrinsic meaning associated with a word, we are now confronted, as Wittgenstein (2001: 2) has highlighted, quoting Saint Augustine's Confession, only with the use of words:
Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires. (Ibid.)
The linguistic turn thus implies the assumption of a shared premise of the impossibility of access to the truth and definitive knowledge. In other words, it seems that there is no longer room for an 'Archimedean true point' from which the critique of ideology used to be possible as an intellectual or practical activity (Norval 2000a: 314) . However, as we will see during the specific analysis of the authors here considered, this anti-essentialist character is an assertion that has to be carefully calibrated. Indeed, there are not only important differences in the specific theoretical approaches employed to reject the idea of a true 'objective' reality but also dissimilar readings of the way in which such a true reality was understood in the classical theory R. Camargo, The New Critique of Ideology © Ricardo Camargo 2013 of ideology, particularly by the Marxist tradition. In any case, what is shared by contemporary authors in the field of ideology is their insistency on using the notion of ideology(ies), in contrast to other post-structuralist scholars, who, following similar patterns of analysis, end up abandoning the notion of ideology altogether on the basis of its actual uselessness. Michel Foucault (1980: 118) , for instance, explicitly explains his doubts about continuing the use of the notion of ideology on the basis of his rejection of the ideas of (objective) truth and a given subject, as well as of the determinism that he necessarily sees as associated to such a notion:
[There are three reasons to reject the notion of ideology,] the first is that, like it or not, it always stands in virtual opposition to something else which is supposed to count as truth … The second drawback is that the concept of ideology refers, I think necessarily, to something of the order of a subject. Thirdly, ideology stands in a secondary position relative to something which functions as its infrastructure, as its material, economic determinant, etc. For these three reasons, I think that this is a notion that cannot be used without circumspection. (Ibid.)
But how can we then explain such insistency in the use of a notion with such a negative reputation? It seems -as suggested by Norval (2000a: 315) -that one reason that might explain the survival of the concept of ideology is related to the theoretical and practical significance of the problems and questions left unresolved by the classical debate in the field, rather than with the pertinence of the theoretical assumptions and answers specifically provided by that debate. The insistency upon using the notion of ideology is thus due to a sense of awareness that through discarding it, in the way proposed by the thesis of 'the end of ideology' or Foucault's circumspection attitude, there would be an implication of abandonment of the whole set of unresolved theorizations involved in this debate. Implicitly, then, there is an appreciation of the challenges posed by the classical debate on the theory of ideology, which would entail the opening of new avenues to rethink them.
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A second main feature of the contemporary debate on ideology is its assumed post-reductionist character, which distances it not only from the economistic versions of Marxism but also from the Althusserian intent to overcome it. The reductionist Marxism, diffused originally by Plekhanov and Kautsky, assumes the unidirectional determination of the superstructurethe political, legal and ideological levels -by the economic structure existing on the basis of society. Furthermore, reductionist Marxism ultimately assumes a structure of separated planes in which the 'state of productive forces' determines, almost in a biological sense, 'the economic relations'. This economic base, in turn, determines 'the social and political order'. Finally, the 'social psychology' of man is determined by both the economy and the social and political order (Jakubowski 1976: 39) .
